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The paper deals with independent local lists ín Croatia, ín 
both analytíc and theoretical way. At thè beginning, thè 
development and current state of local self-government 
and local politicai System in Croatia are described. Data 
on the independent local lists’ participation and success 
during the 2005 general local élections are presented and 
analysed. Four theoretical approaches are proposed for an 
interprétation of the results: System, transition, neo-insti- 
tutional and démocratisation theoiy. None of them can 
alone explain the results ín a satísfactoiy manner. That is 
reason why the author proposes a composite theoretical 
frame, which can explain the rôle and influence of a broad- 
er relevant context on the independent local lists’ élection 
success. Certain theoretical hypothèses are generated and
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to some extent verífíed ín this paper. The advantages of the 
independent local lísts and certain success factors of such 
lists are ídentífíed. Additional theoretícal work and empírí- 
cal vérification are needed. Both qualitative insights and 
quantitative research can be useful.
Key words: independent local lists, locai self-government 
- Croatia, locai politicai System, local élections, composite 









In the process of décentralisation of compétences and financial décen­
tralisation, local self-government system in Croatia is still dealing with the 
steps of institution development, as in many other transition countries. 
Independent local lists continue to be the connecting point at the cross- 
roads of local self-government system and politicai system of a countiy. 
Local self-government Systems are comprised of at least two components* 1 
- politicai and administrative. The politicai one is connected with the issues 
of local democracy, politics and public policies at local level. The admini­
strative one is concerned with policy implémentation, production of public 
services at local level, including communal utilities and social services, rôle 
of local self-government in the whole public administration system, etc. 
However, the whole politicai system can be seen as comprised of several 
different but interconnected layers - central, regional, local, and so forth. 
It seems obvious that along with thè politicai rôle of local self-govern­
ment, there are others, and that besides local part there are other territo­
rial levels in the whole politicai system.
What connects both Systems - self-government and politicai - is their 
presumed orientation towards citizens. From this point, what prevails is 
the notion of localness, local self-government and local (part of) politicai 
system, with independent local lists in thè focus. I will try to analyse in­
dependent local lists in Croatia havíng ín mind thè described integrative
** This article is adapted paper presented atthe scientific workshop Independent Local 
Lists in Europe - A Comparative Perspective held at Martin-Luther-University Halle-Witten­
berg, Halle (Saale) on 13-14 April 2007.
1 Financial one can also be mentioned.
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point of localness. Because of that, it seems logicai to begin the analysis 
with a brief overview of the local self-government System in Croatia. 
After that, I will analyse local politicai System in more detail. Then, the 
focus will be on the main issue of independent local lists. At thè end, I will 
tiy to propose and to outline a theoretical frame for generating additional 
hypothèses, continuation of research and explanation of results.
Croquis of local self-government in Croatia:
development and current state
Croatian histoiy of local self-government is rich, dynamic and can be traced 
back to ancient times. The towns in the Coastal, Mediterranean area of the 
country hâve a particularly interesting and long history. Many of them had 
been founded even before the Roman Empire whose part they used to be. 
Contrary to that, local self-government forms in the continental part of the 
country were established mostly during thè Middle- Ages.
Despite numerous and frequent changes of state arrangements, politicai 
Systems and public institutions, Croatia managed to introduce a modem 
self-government in the 1870s, within the frame of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. Démocratie content of the territorial self-government was 
quite narrow during the first part of the 20th Century, in the then new Yu- 
goslav state (the so-called First Yugoslavia), mostly because of King Alex­
anders dictatorship and Serbian domination over the whole Yugoslavia.2 
During the socialist Yugoslavia, self-management became part of the of­
ficial ideology and a widespread practice with regard to territorial self- 
-government, economic System, and politicai System. Self-management 
in socialist communes - local communities in Marxist form - had much 
in common with the autonomous processes of classical local self-govern­
ment and direct democracy, but without multiparty compétition. The 
whole System was strongly local-oriented, at least within the frame of each 
Yugoslav republic. Th us, at thè end of the 1980s, Croatia inheríted a very 
strong local level and relatively weak republic level, in terms of compé­
tences, finances, civil servants, etc.3
2 Details can be found in Lozina, 2004: 39-100; Hrženjak, 2004: 2-22; Čepulo, 
2000; Perko-Šeparović and Hrženjak, 1982: 57-81.
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The first multiparty démocratie élections were held in May 1990, at both 
territorial levels, local (communes) and central (republic),4 within the 
frame of old, socialist institutions. That means, for example, that repré­
sentative bodies in the communes and at the republic level (Sabor) were 
composed of three chambers; that there were plural votes (certain citizens 
had opportunity to vote two or even three times, for représentatives in two 
or in three chambers), etc.5
These élections and their results served as a basis for speeding up the 
process of gaining independence from other Yugoslav republics. The first 
démocratie Constitution was passed at the end of 1990 (Christmas Con­
stitution). Croatia finally got international récognition at the veiy begin- 
ning of 1992. Although the Constitution guaranteed the right to local 
self-government, thè basic Law on Local Self-Government and Adminis­
tration was not passed until the end of 1992. Only after the Croatian Par- 
liament (Sabor) had passed that Law and certain additional laws, Croatia 
began to construct a completely new System of local self-government. The 
new System of local self-government began to function in the first half of 
1993.
The new System was quite centralised. It was only after parliamentary and 
presidential élections in the winter of 2000, formation and entrance into 
office of the left-wing coalition government, Constitutional Amendments 
of 2000 and 2001,6 and the new Law on Local and Regional Self-Govern- 
ment of 2001, that Croatia entered décentralisation policy (Antic, 2002). 
Right-wing government elected at the end of 2003 has also proclaímed 
décentralisation policy and announced a few décentralisation steps. How- 
ever, despite certain changes of le gai régulation, there is no significant dé­
centralisation in terms of compétences and finances. Croatia has a kind of 
hesitating décentralisation and continues to be a highly centralised coun­
try (Koprić, 2007a).
At the beginning of the 1990s, Croatia was divided into approximately 






4 The Republic of Croatia was at that time still part of Yugoslavia. There was no 
regional level at that time.
5 Interesting research and theoretical approach about the first démocratie élections 
can be found in Grdešić et al,, 1991.
6 The Constitutional Amendments (2000 and 2001) hâve accepted the principles 
of subsidiarity and solidarity, widened the compétences, redesigned counties as units of 
regional self-government, and granted forms of self-government below municipal level with 
legal entity.
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with communes (općina) and towns (grad) at the municipal level and 
counties (županija) at the second level. At thè end of 1992, 418 com­
munes were established as predominantly rural units, 68 towns as urban 
units, and 20 counties as second level units. The City of Zagreb had (and 
still has) legal status and compétences of both first and second level units 
at the same time. Since then, the number of units at the municipal level 
has increased significantly, from 486 to 555 (14.2 %). The number of 
communes has reached 429 (2.6 % increase), and the number of towns 
126 (85.3 % increase). The share of inhabitants living in urban areas has 
increased from 54.3 % to 69 % during the period of 1992-20057 Croatia 
now consists of 555 local units and 20 counties, with spécial status of its 
capital, the City of Zagreb7 8 (see Appendix 1).
Three types of self-government units hâve different compétences and gene­
ral rôle in the governance System.9 It seems that two additional changes 
hâve happened in local governance System over the past fifteen years. 
First, between 1992 and 2001 the counties were supposed to serve as the 
middle tier of government and were intended to be administrative and 
self-government units at the same time, but their first and more important 
rôle was to be the units of deconcentrated state administration. They were 
rearranged as units of regional self-government by the Law on Local and 
Regional Self-Government of 2001, when they lost all compétences with 
regard to deconcentrated state administration and got wider self-govern­
ment compétences (Koprić, 2007). Secondly, a new category of large 
towns was introduced by the amendments on that Law passed in 2005. 
There are fifteen towns with more than 35.000 inhabitants, without the 
City of Zagreb, which are considered to be large towns (Appendix 2).
It should be noted that the forms of self-government below municipal level 
hâve to be established within each local self-government unit. They can be 
established so as to encompass one settlement, a few smaller settlements, 
or even one part of a settlement. They can be established as territorial 
committees (mjesni odbori), town districts (gradski kotareví), and city 
quarters (gradske četvrti; only in the City of Zagreb). Originally conside­
red as the forms of citízens’ participation in local public affaire, they were
7 There are 3.065.473 inhabitants in towns, and 1.371.987 in communes (total is 
4.437.460). - Pavić, 2006: 228-229.
8 With the population of 779.145, the City of Zagreb is the biggest local self-govern­
ment unit in Croatia.
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Locai politicai System: legal régulation,
processes and financing
The main pillars of thè locai politicai System, thè catalysts of locai politicai 
processes, and thè channels of citizens’ influence on local affairs are repré­
sentative bodies, commune and town councils (općinska i gradska vijeća), 
county assemblies (županijske skupštine) and thè City Assembly (Grad­
ska skupština) of thè City of Zagreb. Since 2001, the forms of territorial 
self-government below municipal level hâve also had their représentative 
bodies (vijeća) elected in the so-called territorial élections (mjesni izbori). 
The number of seats in the local and regional représentative bodies has 
to be odd-numbered, it has to be decided by the statute of a self-govern- 
ment unit (its main general regulative act), and dépends on the number of 
inhabitants.10 Among other things, these ranges hâve shown that citizen’s 
vote is worth less in the urban than in the rural municipalities.
Local and regional councillors hâve four-year non-imperative mandates, 
which are not professional, of course. The représentative bodies are com­
petent to regulate ail local affairs, within the frame of law. The main acts 
are Statutes, but local budgets and certain other by-laws are considered 
equally important, at least in terms of the required council majority for 
the final decision on their passing. The sessions of représentative bodies 
are public. Most decisions hâve been previously prepared by représenta­
tive bodies’ committees, which are preparatoiy bodies of local councils. 
The members of représentative bodies elect the president and up to two 
vice-presidents among themselves.
There are two executive bodies in each local and regional unit - executive 
board (poglavarstvo) and an individual executive functionaiy who is at the 
same time president of the executive board (see also Augustinović-Pavičić,
10 Municipal unite with less than 3.000 inhabitants can hâve représentative bodies 
consisting of 7-13 seats, municipalities with 3.001-10.000 inhabitants can hâve bodies of 
9-15 seats, municipalities with 10.001-30.000 inhabitants can hâve bodies of 13-19 seats, 
towns with more of 30.000 inhabitants can hâve représentative bodies of 19-35 members, 
county assemblies can consist of 31-51 seats, and the City Assembly of the City of Zagreb 
consiste of 51 seats. The number of seats in the représentative bodies of the forms of territo­
rial self-government below municipal level is regulated by the municipal Statutes.
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2002). Individual executive functionaries are commune mayors (općinski 
načelnici), town mayors (gradonačelnici), City Mayor (gradonačelnik) of 
thè City of Zagreb, and county governors (župani). Reai politicai power 
in local and regional units lies with executive bodies. The relationship 
between représentative and executive bodies is more parlíamentary-líke. 
On the one hand, mayors, governors and executive boards are elected 
írom thè majority of a représentative body, and are politically responsible 
to that body.11 On the other hand, when a représentative body décidés to 
cast a vote of no confidence against an individuai executive functionaiy or 
against the whole executive board, it must elect a new mayor or governor 
in 30 days. If not, such a représentative body will be dissolved, and new 
local élections will be held.
The professional component of local and regional governance Systems is 
reserved for local civil servants employed by local administrative bodies, 
administrative offices and services (upravni odjeli i službe). There are more 
than 10.000 local civil servants and employées, paid from local budgets. 
Heads of administrative bodies are Professionals, butsince 2005, they can 
be elected as members of executive boards also.
After the first démocratie élections of 1990, local élections were held 
four times, in 1993, 1997, 2001, and 2005. The électoral System was 
changed four times, before general local élections of 1993, 1997, 2001, 
and for the élections of 1995 which took place only in the City of Zagreb, 
Zagrebačka County and certain number of municipalities on the terri- 
toiy of Zagrebačka County. Only the last two local élections, in 2001 and 
2005, were held according to the same rules. It was mainly the very prin- 
ciple of représentation that was changed.
In the 1990 élections, plurality électoral System (»winner-takes-it-all«) was 
applied, with compétition of candidates. After that, a mixed System was 
developed, in which the share of proportional mandate calculation was 
increased. In the élections of 1993, one half of the members of each local 
représentative body were elected in the élection units, by plurality rule, 
and one half of them were elected by proportional représentation from 
party or independent lists. Since then, the share of proportional représen­
tation increased to % for the élections of 1995, and to % for the élections
11 Mayors and governors hâve to be previously elected as members of the représenta­
tive bodies. Other members do not hâve to be elected as représentative bodies’ members. If 
they are, there is an incompatibility between the two positions and they hâve to be substi- 
tuted by other candidates from the élection lists. Heads of local administrative bodies and 
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of 1997. The 2001 and 2005 élections were held with full application of 
thè proportional représentation principle, with compétition of party and 
independent lists,12 without compétition of individuai candidates. Only 
thè lists that gained more than 5 % of votes could participate in thè divi­
sion of seats in représentative bodies (5 % threshold). The number of seats 
for each list was calculated by using D’Hondt’s method.
A clear development line with regard to thè local électoral System can be 
easily noticed, which leads to at least two conclusions. First, thè shift to 
proportional élections indicates a tendency to open possibility for smaller 
politicai actors, both small parties and independent lists, to get involved in 
thè institutional politicai life and to influence locai politicai decision-mak- 
ing. Second, and somewhat confusing, one can speculate about a slight 
tendency to depersonalise locai politics. Namely, in thè proportional élec­
toral System, due to their organisational, personnel, and financial advan- 
tages, politicai parties may acquire thè dominant position over citizens 
who may organise themselves and form independent lists only for locai 
élections. Additionally, citizens have to vote for thè lists, not for indivi­
duai candidates. And finally, thè élection threshold of 5 % and D’Hondt’s 
method are actually not in favour of small parties and independent lists. It 
looks like thè creators of thè électoral rules - and they certainly come from 
thè biggest national politicai parties - are not in favour of personalisation 
of locai politics.
This somehow opens thè issue of thè direct democracy and thè forms 
of direct democracy at thè local level. The Law on Local and Regional 
Self-Government provides for certain forms of direct democracy. These 
are referendum, consultative referendum, locai citizens’ meeting, citizens’ 
initiative, and various forms of territorial self-government below munici­
pal level. Generally speaking, they have been rarely used so far, but when 
used, they were efficient. They are not, as in most other countries, thè 







12 Independent local list, according to thè Law on thè Election of Members of the 
Représentative Bodies of Local and Regional Self-Government Units, are those lists which 
are nominated by a group of voters themselves. There should be 100 voter signatures for a 
communal list, 150 for a town list, and 500 for a county list or for an independent Est in 
the City of Zagreb in order for the list be legally valid. The number of such an independent 
list members should be the same as the number of members of a local représentative body. 
Behind such a list there can be a civil society organization, a strong personality with his/her 
friends or family, a company, a group of citizens, party or non-party members, or someone 
else. However, the officiai name of the list should be »independent communal / town / city 
/ county list«. The name of the first member on a list is be added (for example, Indépendant 
Communal List of Plinio Cuc curin).
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stitutions. Rather, they serve as means of correcting the rough will of po­
liticai elites who have lead the processes of local politicai decision-making 
through local executive and représentative bodies. From that aspect, their 
veiy presence, not practical usage, is veiy important for the relaxation of 
thè politicai System (see also Almond and Verba, 2000: 349 and subsé­
quent).
Certain other institutions have also served to the same purpose. These are 
the représentatives of national minorities in local représentative bodies, 
special minority councils and minority représentatives with consultative 
and general supervisory compétences, and youth councils with consulta­
tive role in locai politics.
The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities of 2002 pro- 
vides for the presence of national minorities’ représentatives in each locai 
and regional unit where certain national minority has a minimum 5 % 
share of inhabitants. If the share is between 5 and 15 %, the Law requires 
at least one national minority représentative. If the share is above 15 %, 
there has to be just the proportional share of national minority représen­
tatives in a local représentative body.13 If a minority is underrepresented 
after élections, the number of local représentative body members rises for 
the necessaiy number and new members enter the représentative body 
from the competing local lists, according to the élection success. If that 
solution cannot resolve the problem of représentation, additional élec­
tions will be held (Art. 20). Eveiy local and regional unit is allowed to 
increase the number of national minority représentatives autonomously
13 The Serb minority is the biggest national minority in Croatia. The share of that 
minority in the population is the highest in Vukovarsko-srijemska County (15.5 %). Its 
presence in other counties is as follows: 11.7 % in Sisačko-moslavačka county, 11.5 % in 
Ličko-senjska county, 11 % in Karlovačka county, 9.1 % in Šibensko-kninska County, 8.7 % 
in Osječko-baranjska County, 7.1% in Bjelovarsko-bilogorska and in Virovitičko-podravska 
Counties, and 6.5 % in Požeško-slavonska County. Italian minority reaches 6.9 % in the 
population of Istarska County. The presence of other national minorities is more dotted- 
like. There is Hungárián minority in certain units on the territory of Osječko-baranjska and 
Vukovarsko-srijemska Counties. There are 40.9 % of the Hungarians in the population of 
the Commune of Kneževi Vinogradi, 35.1 % in the Commune of Bilje, 26 % in the Com­
mune of Draž, 21.6 % in the Commune of Ernestinovo, 18 % in the Commune of Tordinci, 
14.4 % in the Commune of Petlovac, etc. The biggest Check minority is on the territory 
of Bjelovarsko-bilogorska County, precisely in the Communes of Končanica (46.7 %) and 
Dežanovac (23.5 %), and in the towns of Daruvar (18.9 %) and Grubišno Polje (18 %). The 
presence of the Remanies is the biggest on the territory of Međimurska County, especially 
in the Communes of Orehovica (8.6 %) and Mala Subotica (7.6 %). Other represented na­
tional minorities are the Bosnians, Albanians, and Slove nians in certain parts of thè country 
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above the mentioned share, but only íf ít is not thè unit ín whích a na­
tional minori 1y has the majority share of population (Art. 21). National 
mínoríty représentation has to be ensured ín local executive and adminis­
trative bodíes as well (Art. 22).
The same Law has provided for the whole network of separate, special na­
tional mínoríty councils and représentatives. A national mínoríty council 
can be established by those mínorítíes which hâve a share in local popula­
tion over 1.5 %, or which hâve at least 200 national mínoríty members in 
a local unit, or 500 members in a regional unit. National mínoríty councils 
consist of 10 members in the communes, 15 members in the towns and 
25 members in the counties. In the local and regional units which do 
not hâve the mentioned preconditions for the establishment of national 
mínoríty councils, any national mínoríty with at least 100 members can 
elect its own individual représentative. The mandate of the councils and 
représentatives lasts four years. The main rôle of both national mínoríty 
councils and représentatives is to participate in local public life and mana­
gement of local affaire. They can participate through proposais, infor­
mation sharing, consultations, supervision, etc. The legal status of these 
councils is the status of non-profit legal entities. The main sources of na­
tional mínoríty councils’ and représentatives’ finances are local, regional 
and state budgets. Additionally, at least two national mínoríty councils 
can establish a coordination of national mínoríty councils and make thè ir 
position much stronger through such networking (Articles 23-34).
The recent Law on Youth Councils of 2007 has provided for similar lo­
cal consultative mechanism on behalf of young people. However, the 
initiative for establishing youth councils does not dépend on the will of 
represented citizens, as is the case with the national mínoríty councils 
and représentatives. Youth councils should be established by local repré­
sentative bodies themselves, as their consultative bodies, with the purpose 
to attract young people to participate in local public life.14 Individuals 
between 15 and 29 years of âge are considered to be young people. The 
number of youth council members can be between 5 and 15, dépends on 
the size of local population, and should be odd-numbered. The mandate 
of youth représentatives lasts two years. Finances and premises for youth
14 One recent research in Croatia has shown that only 56 % of the young (secondary 
school) generation sees démocratie politicai System as a désirable solution (Vujčić, 2006). It 
seems somewhat disturbing and requires designing an appropriate démocratie éducation for 
young générations. Including young people into local politics could be one practical aspect 
of such an éducation.
Ivan Koprić: Independent Local Lists in Croatia ...
HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA, god. 7. (2007.), br. 2., str. 335-375 345
councíls should be ensured by local and regional units. The Law requíres 
thè establishment of youth councils beidre 9* September 2007. 
Proportional élection System, as a rule, leads to a greater politicai frag­
mentation and heterogeneity in représentative bodies, which can cause 
the instability of executive bodies. It is hard to ele et executive functionar- 
ies and boards in such conditions, and the chances for voting no confi­
dence are real and great. Practically each vote in a représentative body is 
important and that is a basis for ail kinds of unethical behaviour of local 
councillors. In certain recent cases, parties or the représentatives of lists 
with only one or two votes asked, and what is more, succeed in getting 
the positions of mayors, presidents of local représentative bodies, other 
influential positions or lucrative jobs in communal services or communal 
utility Companies, etc.
Such unethical behaviour has speeded up the ongoing discussion about 
thè appropriate ins ti tutional solutions. Direct élections of town and com­
mune mayors and county governors were proposed as the main solution 
some five years ago. Almost all politicai parties, associations of local and 
regional self-government units, influential NGOs and other stakeholders 
hâve formed a policy coalition about the introduction of such élections. 
A minority of experts and university professore are also ín favour of that 
solution (Podolnjak, 2005), but thè majority of them have been warning 
and raising questions about the potential risks of such a solution (see Ko­
prić, 2005; Sokol, 2006: 3; see also Larsen, 2002). Draft Law on Direct 
Elections of Commune and Town Mayors and County Governors was 
prepared and entered the legislative procedure in July 2005 as a Govern­
ments proposai. The shift towards the élection of mayors and fundamen­
tal change in the functioning of local politicai System from parliamentaiy- 
-líke to presídentíal-líke is being prepared for the local élections of 2009 
and the period after that. The Law has not been passed yet, although ít is 
undergoing the legislative procedure.
Another attempt to solve the problem of unethical politicai behaviour 
deals with the way of financing politicai actors. The new Law on the Fi- 
nancing of Political Parties, Independent Lists and Candidates was passed 
at the veiy beginning of 2007. The Law intends to ensure transparency in 
financing thè politicai actors, efficient financial control, preventing cer­
tain subjects from financing thè politicai actors, limitation of donations,15
15 An individual is allowed to give up to 90.000 HRK (about €12.169) per year to a 
particular politicai party or independent list. A legai entity can give up to 1.000.000 HRK 
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interdiction of receiving donations írom anonymous subjects, interdiction 
of the usage of public assets and funds for private purposes, etc. The Law 
contains new, stricter rules of financial support to politicai parties and 
members of représentative bodies from independent lists at all leve ls.16 
However, the Law does not contain ail important safeguarding mecha- 
nisms, which hâve been proposed during the previous public and profes­
sional discussion (Jelušić, 2007).
The Law is applied to the independent lists, also. The leaders of indepen­
dent lists are obliged to open an account for élection campaign expenses. 
Elected independent lists’ members hâve the right to get regulär financial 
aid for their représentative activities from the respective budgets (local, 
regional, or central). They can hâve their offices for administrative and 
professional support with their own employées (Art. 26).
Independent local lists: Scyllas and Haribdas 
of local politics
The rôle of local independent lists can be conceptualised in many ways. 
Somewhat fancy interprétation during and immediately after the last gene­
ral local élections of 2005 was connected with thè criticism of politicai 
parties and unethical behaviour of (local) politicians. Previous general lo­
cal élections of 2001 were also held with the application of the propor­
tional élection System, thus generating the fragmentation of local politicai 
scene and pushing politicai actors to ail kinds of coalitions necessary for 
the formation of the executive bodies (Omejec, 2002). Public perception 
of local politics and governance Systems was somewhat weak.
One of the bad examples was related to the Ciiy of Zagreb. Two left-wing par­







16 The total sum of money for politicai parties and independent members should be 
calculated so as to amount 0.056 % of total budget expenses in the respective unit for previ­
ous year. The total sum is divided with the total number of représentative body members and 
should be paid to thè politicai parties and independent members (members elected from 
the independent lists). The amount is raised 10 % for every iemale member. Political parties 
hâve been getting sums which dépend on their member share in a représentative body. Re­
présentative bodies’ members elected from the independent lists hâve been getting money 
on their special bank accounts. To prevent the after-election fragmentation and manipula­
tions with budget money, it is stipulated that after-election changes in party membership as 
a rule cannot change financial support sums that hâve once been determined on the basis of 
élection results (Articles 7-13).
Ivan Koprić: Independent Local Lists in Croatia ...
HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA, god. 7. (2007.), br. 2., str. 335-375 347
a coalition, having 32 of 51 seats. Certain concrete circumstances caused 
disharmony, sometimes even a conflict between the coalition partners. 
Having in mind that the City of Zagreb is the greatest, economically and 
in other ways the most important local unit in Croatia, it is not hard to 
imagine that disharmony in the ruling coalition was an eveiyday media 
and public topic. With some other examples, this significanti^ contributed 
to voters’ negative impressions about locai politics. However, this caused 
only a slight increase of the share of independent lists’ seats in the City 
of Zagreb Assembly after the 2005 élections, írom 9.8 to 13.7 % (see Ap­
pendix 8). Nevertheless, changes in the share of seats of certain politicai 
parties were substantial (Ivanišević, 2006).
The results of the so-called territorial élections for the city quarters’ coun­
cils in the City of Zagreb show a situation veiy similar to the situation with 
the City Assembly. There were two such élections, in the years 2000 and 
2005. Independent lists managed to win only 9 out of 283 seats in the city 
quarters’ councils or 3.2 % of the total number of council seats in the 2000 
élections. The result of the independent lists was a bit better four and a 
half years later. They won 12 out of 271 council seats, or 4.4 % of the total 
number of seats in city quarters councils (Appendix 7).
Such a situation leads to a two-fold hypothesis. First, it might be that ur- 
ban units for some reasons are not a suitable scene for independent lists. 
Second, it is possible that bigger units do not provide suitable conditions 
for thè success of local independent lists.
Croatian data on 2005 general local élections could be used to support 
both hypothèses (Appendixes 3 and 4). There were 397 independent lists 
in compétition for the seats in the communes’ councils. It counts for 65.3 % 
of ail the competing lists (608 of them). In contrast, there were only 194 
lists in the towns, including the City of Zagreb, which count for 31.9 % of 
the total number of the independent local lists. Only 17 independent lists 
competed at the counly level (2.8 %).
Additionally, as much as 77.1 % of independent lists in the communes 
were successful (306 of 397), compared with only 49 % of such lists in 
the towns (95 of 194). Successful independent lists in the communes won 
629 seats or 73.8 % of the total number of seats that were won by all inde­
pendent lists. Only 202 seats were won by independent lists in the towns 
(23.7 %). Although the average number of seats that were won by inde­
pendent lists is the same for independent lists in the communes and in the 
towns (2.1), it should be noted that the number of seats in communes is 
smaller in average, according to their smaller number of inhabitants and 
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mûries with 1.900 inhabitants in average, and only one town among thè 
most successful examples, i.e. local uníts ín whích independent lísts won 
the élections (Appendix 5). Fínally, takíng intő account the number of 
inhabitants, ít could be calculated that there are 629 représentatives írom 
independent lists on 1.371.987 inhabitants of all communes, whích gíves 
the ratio of 1 représentative on 2.181 inhabitants, wTiíle ín towns that ra­
tio is 1 représentative on 15.176 inhabitants (202 : 3.065.473).
What could be the reasons for such a state of affaire? Part of the possible 
explanation lies in the nature of two kinds of local units. In rural commu- 
nities there are many concrete problems whích are mainly not in thè focus 
of big national politicai parties, not even the regional ones. After that, 
personal profile of local polítícíans can be the most important in com­
munes as in average significanti/ smaller communítíes.17 It seems that the 
programme profile and other characteristics of thè politicai parties can 
influence voters in local élections, especially in smaller uníts, only to a limi­
ted extent. A hypothesís can probably be formulated whích says that the 
chances for thè success of independent lists are proportionally higher as 
number of inhabitants in a local unit decreases. With regard to this, it can 
be noted that 12 communes where independent lists won the élections 
hâve significanti^ smaller average population than the average population 
of a Croatian commune (1.900 vs. 3.221).
One organisational reason seems to be practically important also: only a 
few politicai parties hâve their branches in smaller communes. Political 
parties are mostly interested in acquiring politicai support in towms, be- 
cause of the simple fact that a significanti/ larger number of people lives 
there. The overall pénétration of politicai parties is lesser in smaller units, 
and stronger in larger units, as a rule. Because of that, there is less space 
for independent lists in the larger units, i.e. towns (see also Kasapović, 
2004).
Of course, this argument is in a way connected with the situation in the 
whole politicai and social System. If thè politicai System is not veiy stable, 
many changes in the structure of politicai parties can be predicted, prob­
lems with building parties’ organisational apparátus, lesser pénétration, 
etc. If there is a dense network of NGOs and stronger civil society, whích 
is mainly not a characteristic of rural municipalities, there is greater space
17 As much as 242 or 56.8 % of communes hâve less than 3.000 inhabitants, while 
additional 117 or 27.5 % hâve between 3.000 and 5.000 inhabitants. Only 67 or 15.7 % of 
communes hâve more than 5.000 inhabitants. As of 2004, average population in communes 
is 3.221, while in towns it reaches 18.588. - Pavić, 2006.
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to express specific interests of local commimities through thè indepen­
dent lists which are led by strong local personalities. Apart írom that, 
towns give such a social and institutional environment where one can pro- 
fessionalize his/her politicai activity as a real job, while in the rural areas 
almost all politicians are predominantly engaged with some other, mostly 
agricultural or similar activity.18
Differentiation of citizens’ interests and generally higher overall living 
standard in the towns are favourable conditions for both, stabilisation of 
politicai parties and civil society development. In towns, there is a better 
offer of various politicai parties’ programmes. Civil society is able to ab- 
sorb a wide variety of public interests, also. So, there is less need to search 
fór something else.
Besídes, towns are not a suítable environment for the success of strong 
personalities. Behind each independent list there is a strong personality.19 
Towns are highlystratified communities, with a lot of well-known and suc- 
cessful people, with many Professionals of ail kinds, with better economic 
situation and better communal infrastructure, with denser institution net­
work, with much greater number of voters, etc. In such a situation, it 
is not an easy task to build one’s media and overall public image which 
would ensure thè possibility to gain seat(s) in local council. Chances to 
win local élections are even slighter.
The data on the number of independent lists and their success in rural 
and urban municipalities show a great différence and tentatively confirm
18 In the well-known example of Mošćenička Draga, the major who has won several 
subséquent mandates with his independent list is at the same time afisherman. His list won 
5 of 9 seats in the last élections of 2005.
19 For example, the independent list which succeeded in gaining 4 seats in the Town 
Council of Split is led by the former well-known basketball player Željko Jerkov, who has 
been a very successful businessman for some time. In the City of Zagreb Assembly 4 seats 
were gained by the independent list led by Tatjana Holjevac, daughter of one of the most 
populär City Mayors ever, Većeslav Holjevac. In the City of Zagreb Assembly 3 seats were 
won by the independent list of Boris Mikšić, the man who returned from the USA with 
rather fuz2y curriculum vitae, with snob-like manners, pretending to be successful business­
man. The independent list led by Plinio Cuccurin won in the Commune of Bale Council. 
Cuccurin is very well-known member of the Board of Directors in thè biggest tobacco com­
pany in the region. Stipo Gabrić, considered as one of the rieh tycoons (persons who have 
suddenly succeed in becoming rich during the non-transparent privatisation of the former 
so-called social ownership under suspicious circumstances) and one of the best-known dis­
sidents from the long time leading Croatian politicai party, HDZ (Croatian Démocratie 
Community), led victorious independent list in the Town of Metković ( 11 of 17 seats; 64.7 %) 
and the successful independent list for County Assembly of the Dubrovačko-neretvanska 
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the descríbed way of thinking. Independent lists were competíng ín many 
more towns than in communes, reaching 76.6 % of the total number of 
towns during last general local élections of 2005. At the same time, inde­
pendent list were competíng in only 57.7 % of the total number of com­
munes. These data probably indicate more intensive politicai interest, or 
interest to partícípate in local polítícs ín urban uníts. However, thè success 
of independent local lists was sígnífícantly lower only in the urban units, 
as has been mentioned (the ratio between towns and communes is 49 % : 
77.1 % of successful independent lists). That confirms the thesis that the 
chances to succeed with an independent list in the towns are generally 
much smaller, probably because of different nature of local communities 
and because of their size.
The problem with independent lists’ participation in the élections for 
county assemblies is easier to notice.20 The counties are relatively new 
units, with rôle and compétences that have been changing (more in Ko­
prić, 2007). They are not sufficiently rooted in historical and wider so­
cial context. It is hard to expect them to be homogeneous with regard to 
citizens’ interests, or to become points of regional identification. Finally, 
they are much bigger than towns. In that way again, the size of élection 
units seems to be significant. So, independent lists can hardly succeed in 
the élections at the county level. The results of 2005 élections support 
that conclusion. The share of unsuccessful independent lists is veiy high 
(88.2 %). Only two independent lists at the county level succeeded in 
gaining seats and both cases have an interesting context.
In Dubrovačko-neretvanska County the independent list led by Stipo 
Gabrić gaíned 7 of 41 seats and became an important politicai actor ín 
the County Assembly. Although his politicai attitudes could be conside- 
red rather conservative, he entered into coalition with left-wing parties, 
mostly because he did not want to form a coalition with the HDZ. He is 
a dissident from that party, he was accused of privatisation crimes by his 
previous party colleagues, and the intensity of the conflict between hím 
and the H DZ was obviously so high that ít prevented hím from joining the 
coalition with his former cronies.
20 During its history, Croatia usually had the second tier of government, but with dif­
ferent rôles, compétences, number of units, etc. Counties as part of the common Hungárián 
and Croatian héritage were re-established in the early 1990s. However, they are of relativelly 
small size, with average size of 2.800 square kilométrés and 183.000 inhabitants (the City 
of Zagreb excluded). They have not beenformed with respect to historical Croatian régions 
such as Slavonia or Dalmatia. Politicai needs and respects have overwhelmed historical, 
social, legai and technical criteria of county mapping (see also Antulov, 2000: 6).
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The case with thè independent list of Branimir Glavaš in Osječko-baranj- 
ska County has certain similarities with thè previously described case, but 
also a few essential différences. Glavaš was one of thè most influential 
members of thè ruling party, thè HDZ, with seemingly impressive but 
somewhat murky war record. Some time before thè generai local élections 
of 2005, he split írom hís party’s maínstream and suddenly started to pro- 
mote regíonalism, which was quite stränge. He argued that Slavonia, one 
of the three historié Croatian régions,21 was receivíng too little attention 
and funds írom the State Budget. Hís conflíct with hís former party was 
veiy intensive. As there was certain number of the highest state servants 
and state functionaries under hís strong influence, he managed to gather 
many of them in an attempt to establish a new politicai party before gene­
ral local élections. However, he did not succeed and had to compete with 
local lists only. His success was sígnífícant. Hís independent county list 
gaíned 14 of 47 or 29.8 % of the seats ín the County Assembly of Osječko- 
-baranjska County. In Osijek Town Council he gaíned even more, 8 of 25 
or 32 % of the seats. After the élections he entered into coalitions with the 
ultra (far) right-wing Croatian Party of Rights (HSP). He also succeeded 
in establishing a new politicai party, the Croatian Démocratie Party of 
Slavonia and Baranja (HDSSB), regional, according to its name, with as­
pirations to widen its influence throughout Slavonia.22
Both cases hâve shown that the situation that can help certain indepen­
dent list to succeed ín units such as Croatian countíes has to be very 
strong and specific. The data on the success of independent lists at both 
local and county levels show that the chances to succeed are goíng to dí- 
mínish at eveiy wider level of thè governance System. Data on the results 
of independent lists at the national level are goíng ín the same direction 
- not one independent list was successful ín the parliamentaiy élections of 
2000 and 2003 (Kasapovic, 2004: 85).23
21 Croatia used to be considered a three-part state (Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia) 
since thè Middle Ages.
22 It includes five counties: Osječko-baranjska, Vukovarsko-srijemska, Požeško-sla- 
vonska, Virovitičko-podravska, and Brodsko-posavska.
23 There were 57 independent lists in the parliamentary élections of 2003, ail unsuc- 
cessful (Kasapovic, 2004: 85). In previous parliamentary élections there were a few inde­
pendent members in Croatian Parliament (Sabor), because of at least partial usage of the 
plurality rule (»winner-takes-it-all«). Their number was 1 (1.25 %) in the 1990 élections, 5 
(3.62 %) in the élections of 1992, 4 (3.15 %) in the élections of 1995, and 3 (1.99 %) in the 
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Both described cases have also led to the questions about thè índepen- 
dence of local lísts. What kínd of índependence, whose índependence, 
índependence írom whom, how much índependence, are but a few of 
such questions. However, before that, two more circumstances should be 
taken into account - regional différences in popularity of independent lo­
cal lists, and the role of independent lists in minority issues.
Regional différences in the presence of independent local lists are quite 
noticeable. Three main observations can be made. Independent local lists 
were competing during the élections of 2005 in 354 of 570, or 62.1 % of 
local and regional units. In some parts of thè country, independent lists 
were significantly more widespread than in others. On thè one end of the 
continuum there were Coastal countíes, led by Zadarska County. Indepen­
dent lists were competing in 84.8 % of local units on the territory of Za­
darska County (28 of 33). On the second place was Istarska County with 
independent lists in 79.5 % of local units (31 of 39), Splitsko-dalmatinska 
County was on the fourth place with such lists in 78.2 % of local units (43 
of 55), and Primorsko-goranska County on the sixth with independent 
lists in 74.3 % of units (26 of 35). Although additional research on that 
topic would be needed, one can speculate that stronger interest in local 
polítícs is connected with the Medíterranean region, whích has a long 
hístory of locai self-government. It should be noted that parts of Croatía, 
especíally parts of Splitsko-dalmatinska County, have hístorícal tíes with 
ancíent Greece and with hístorícal roots of Greek democracy. Certain 
other parts, also maínly ín the Coastal region, have had veiy clear deve- 
lopmental paths sínce the ancíent tímes (Roman Empire, for example) 
or sínce thè Middle Ages, probably possessíng hístorícal réminiscences 
on thè then strong and wíde town autonomy. Such réminiscences are pro­
bably good ground for stronger interest ín local polítícs.24
On the other end of thè continuum of independent lists’ presence were 
Varaždinska County, with such lísts ín as little as 17.9 % of local units (5 
of 28), and Bjelovarsko-bilogorska County (21.7 %; independent lists in 
only 5 of 23 local units). These extremes are not easy to interpret, but ít 
seems that the offer of politicai party lists or candidates on those lists was 
much better and much widely accepted than in other parts of the country. 
Sínce politicai parties managed to acquire strong support, there was no
24 In 2001 general local élections there was a similar pattern of the independent local 
lists participation. In the six Coastal counties independent lists competed in 62.9 % of local 
units, while in the continental part of thè country independent lists competed in 54 % of 
local units (Kasapović, 2004: 87-88).
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space for independent lists. In Varaždinska County, there is one of the 
main footholds of the Croatian People’s Party (HNS) while in the county 
seat, thè Town of Varaždin, there is a strong and stable politicai support 
for the Croatian Socio-Liberal Party (HSLS), mainly because of its town 
mayor and list holder in the Town of Varaždin. In Bjelovarsko-bilogorska 
County the situation is different in the county seat, the Town of Bjelovar, 
where Socio-Liberals have very strong support and in other local units 
where the Croatian Peasants’ Party has a significant influence. However, 
there is a similar situation in other parts of thè country as well. This is the 
reason why other variables have to be introduced and researched. It may 
be that a different, more co-operative, politicai culture has been develop- 
ing, or that the core local goals have already been identified, which allows 
for reducing the intensity of locai politicai conflicts, etc. It should be con- 
cluded that surprisingly weaker presence of independent lists in certain 
parts of the country has to attract additional research attention.
Stronger presence of independent lists in some parts of the country can 
be explained by some veiy specific reasons. Such is the situation, for ex­
ample, in Osječko-baranjska County, where a new party, the Croatian 
Démocratie Party of Slavonia and Baranja (HDSSB), was in the forming 
phase during the local élections of 2005. This parly in statu nascendi was 
in a way hiding behind the independent lists.
Stronger presence of independent lists in Sisačko-moslavačka County 
was a little surprising (independent lists in 15 of 19, i.e. in 78.9 % of lo­
cai units, which is third best resuit). Two main ideas can be mentioned. 
First, Sisak used to be and stili is an industriai town, and such are some 
other towns in the County (Kutina, even Petrinja), but the main industrial 
branches, chemical industry and iron and Steel industiy, are in crisis. It 
might be that industrial workers and trade unions culture cali for more 
robust, more intensive and anti-party engagement in attempts to résolve 
big social and local problems.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that a major part of that county was en- 
gulfedby the war and the Serb minority rébellion (1991-1996). In tenyears 
that elapsed between the censuses of 1991 and 2001, Sisačko-moslavačka 
County was faced with an enormous dépopulation and changes in the 
population structure. The number of inhabitants decreased from 286.914 
to 185.387 (dépopulation of 35.4 %), and the share of the Serb minority 
feil from 34.5 % to 11.7 % (Hrženjak, 2004: 103). In a situation with many 
unresolved after-war problems, it can be logically expected that the Serb 
minority is tiying to find an alternative politicai way to gain positions in 
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politicai parties with national labels. The same is trae for thè Croatian 
minori ly in certain other local units.25
It strongly raises the issue of minorities in discussion about independent 
local lists. The idea about hiding behind independent lists seems espe- 
cially plausible in the conditions of unconsolidated inter-ethnic relations 
in certain parts of Croatia,26 but it calls for additional research.
However, even in normal conditions, it seems that richer national minori­
ty structure can stimulate the forming of independent local lists.27 In a 
dotted pattern of the national minority territorial structure, an indepen­
dent list can acquire an image separated and different from politicai par­
ties’ images, especially from big national parties; as well as the feeling of 
self-determination and self-confirmation, so precious for national minori- 
ties (Schöpflin, 2001: 16).28
Independence in composite theoretical frame
Previous rather descriptive and narrative analysis based on meagre em- 
pirical data at thè end provokes deeper theoretical questions and calls for 
theoretical explanations. Firstly, there are the questions about indepen­
dence and the circumstances which stimulate or de-stimulate the presence 
and success of independent lists in the élections for local représentative 
bodies. Secondly, there are the questions about deeper theoretical frame. 
Such a frame might lead to the identification of new explanations, to the 
évaluation of possible explanations, and to putting the already accepted 
and verified explanations in a new light. In other words, a theoretical 
frame should help to generate, specify and evaluate the hypothèses about 
independent local lists, systematize them and, in such a way, form a theo­







25 In Sisačko-moslavačka County there are two communes with thè Serb majority 
and the Croatian minority. In Dvor there are 3.495 Serbs and 1.943 Croats, while in Gvozd 
the ratio is 2.193 : 1.500 (Hrženjak, 2004: 103).
26 There still persists a rather deep cleavage between Croatian and Serb communi- 
ties. The worst is probabty the case o£ Vukovar. See, for example, Gosselin, 2004.
27 A good illustration can be found in the Commune of Kneževi Vinogradi (Osječko- 
baranjska County), with independent list of the Hungárián minority. See case study of Đ 
urie, 2004: 89.
28 See, for example, richreviews in Bíró and Kovács, 2001; Gál, 2002.
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In my opinion, a composite theoretical frame can be employed to achieve 
the mentioned results. Itshould consist of System theoiy, transition theo­
ry, neo-institutional theory, and démocratisation theory, at least in transi­
tion countries.
The System theory offers three main views which see social Systems as (1) 
closed Systems, consisting of relatively autonomous elements integrated 
in the wholeness by certain basic principles, (2) open Systems, characteri- 
sed by dynamic and complex relations, interdependence and exchange 
with different segments of System environment, and (3) self-referential 
Systems, in which human conscience serves as a mechanism of self-obser- 
vation, self-identification, self-reference and autopoiesis.29
Although the System theoiy could seem too general, it may warn about 
the questions about the wholeness and parts of a politicai System, their 
characteristics, relevant System environment, the relationships among 
parts within a System, and the relationships between the System and envi­
ronment and their characteristics, etc. Of course, these questions should 
be applied to the politicai System in general, as well as to particular na­
tional politicai Systems. More concretely, and having in mind indepen­
dent local lists, there are the following questions about:
- fragmentation, consolidation, and stabilisation of thè politicai Sys­
tem, and influence of independent lists on these characteristics,
- nature of independent local lists and their function in the whole 
politicai System,
- reasons from politicai and broader sociétal environment which 
cause thè presence and success of independent local lists (for ex­
ample, forms of direct democracy, politicai party System, structure 
and relationships between local units’ bodies, channels of politicai 
accountability, legal régulation, density and quality of civil society, 
politicai and social culture, ethics in politicai System, etc).
In an attempt to answer these and similar questions, the transition theory 
should be taken into account, also.30 There are many various notions of
29 Crédits for this insight should be given mainly to Niklas Luhmann. See, for exam­
ple, Pusić, 1989: 61-62. About the concept of autopoiesis and its usage in different fields, 
including organisation and social Systems, with critics on the Luhmann’s contribution, see 
Minge rs, 1995.
30 In such a way Lewis argues: »In view of the short time that has elapsed since 1989 
and the wide-ranging nature of the transformation that has occurred since then CE party 
Systems are, understandably, less Consolidated and less well defined than is the case with 
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the last large transition, thè transition írom prevíous socialist Systems 
with command economy to the démocratie Systems with market econo- 
my. Marčetić has recently described eight of them, but, certainly, addi­
tional notions of transition might be established or developed (Marčetić, 
2005: 7-48). Post-socialist transition can be considered as a complex 
systemic transformation different from the previous démocratie transi­
tions in Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal), Latin America, and certain 
other parts of the world. The main différence is connected with the span 
of transition processes: previous transitions can be mainly considered as 
démocratisation, tackling thè politicai Systems. Post-socialist transition is 
more complex and comprehensive, a systemic one, tackling almost eveiy 
aspect of social life. If such a concept is taken as acceptable and the most 
productive, there is obvious need to put the discussion about independent 
local lists in a much broader context, and in the context of dynamic pro­
cesses of overall transition.
Two main additional issues are raised and stimulated by transition theoiy, 
with regard to the broader context of independent local lists. First, there 
is the issue of stabilisation and consolidation of a new démocratie politi­
cai System, but that issue has already been raised by the System theoiy, 
although in a more general manner. Second, and more important issue 
from the standpoint of the theory development, is concerned with design, 
building and development of the new institutions in transitional context 
in Eastern, Central and South-Eastern Europe.
New institutionalism is a veiy common and widespread theoretical frame 
(see, for example, Marčetić, 2006: 8-36). It warns about the significance 
of institutions and the rules, as March and Olsen hâve recently said: »Po­
litical institutions and rules matter. Most people in politics and politicai 
institutions follow rules most of the time if they can ... Rules and under- 
standings frame thought, shape behaviour, and constrain interprétation.« 
(March and Olsen, 1995: 31). However, the design of new institutions is 
somewhat uncertain, in a way »that designers of new institutions are often 
writing on water« (Putnam, 1993: 17). In other words, broader sociétal 
context, culture and other factors should be taken into account.31 Finally, 
rules are product of sociétal context and live and function in sociétal con-
31 Woliman daims that several factors should be taken into considération in explain- 
ing the cross-countiy variance of the public sector reform trajectories: socio-economic con­
text, institutional and cultural tradition and »path dependencies«, institutional setting (poli- 
ty), constellation of relevant politicai and socio-economic actors, reform coalition, starting 
conditions. - Woliman, 2001: 15-16.
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text. Just knowing thè rules is not enough; research on real life of raies 
(on independent local lists and other issues of local politicai System, for 
example) in society is a much more productive approach. Another aspect 
of institutional approach, which can be named »historical-institutionalist 
approach« (Wollmann, 2000), has been searching for identification of 
different phases in the institution building. Such an approach can show 
transition as a chain of institutional choices and sequence of phases in 
developing certain institutions, including independent local lists.
Finally, there is obvious need for inclusion of the démocratisation theory 
into the composite theoretical frame. It seems that there is no unitary 
démocratisation theoiy, nor unitary theory of democracy. Even the défini­
tion of democracy is not easy to find. March and Olsen are considering 
four parts or components of democracy:
- »a commitment to personal liberty and individual responsibility 
in its exercise«,
- »the idea of populär sovereignty and politicai equality«,
- »faith in the rôle of individuai and collective human reason in hu­
man affaire«, and
- »an emphasis on procédural reliability and stability, on the rule 
of law and the régulation of arbitrary power« (March and Olsen, 
1995: 2-3).32
However, a doser look can open issues of plural society in which the situa­
tion is more complex and precarious, with a lot of preconditions for stable 
democracy. Many post-socialist societies can be considered plural and 
may require more complex thinking about démocratisation. At least some 
of them need to understand and build consociational democracy, i.e. a 
politicai System characterised by a great coalition of all the important seg­
ments: leaders, a kind of veto in the hands of minority, proportionality 
principle in entering and holding public positions, and autonomy of all 
segments (Lijphart, 1992: 32).
32 There are a lot of other conceptualizations. Dahl has, for example, invented the 
concept of polyarchy, meaning a politicai System which is at the same time liberal and par­
ticipative (Dahl, 1998). Almond and Verba have considered the balance between efficient 
power to rule and accountability to citizens as one of the most important pillars of democ­
racy. Such a balance can be best kept in conditions of the civic culture (Almond and Verba, 
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Inter-ethnic and other structural splits and cleavages33 generate conili cts 
and ask for their politicai formulation and représentation intő thè formal 
politicai System. In a way, thè presence of different politicai parties and 
independent lists can be seen as a method for thè relaxation of social 
tensions. Of course, the very institution and the whole System of local 
self-government has many advantages in this regard. Inter alia, it prevents 
politicai power concentration, localises politicai conflicts, relaxes inter- 
ethnic tensions, educates citizens and contributes to démocratie politi­
cai culture, educates politicians for politicai positions at national level, 
etc. (Koprić, 2006a: 254-255). This is one of the main reasons why »the 
introduction of new institutions of local democracy was an inherent and 
important part of the comprehensive reforms of the early 1990s in East- 
Central Europe« (Baldersheim, 2003: 241).
Thus, a composite theoretical circle or model for deepening the under- 
standing of independent local lists phenomenon, consisting of four théo­
ries - System theoiy, transition theoiy, neo-institutional theory, and dé­
mocratisation theory- has been outlined.
Ail possible ways of thinking, attempts to operationalise this composite 
theory, ail the hypothèses, could not be followed in this article. Neverthe- 
less, the issue of local lists independence should be explored once again at 
this point, within the frame determined by several questions derived from 
the composite theoiy. These are the following:
- Is the presence of independent local lists a component of politicai 
démocratisation or de-democratisation?
- Can they stabilise and consolidate multi-party Systems of transi- 
tional countries or they promote politicai fragmentation and dé­
stabilisation?
- Do they represent a modem politicai institution or a sign of po­
liticai System decline?
On the one hand, by opening possibility to certain small groups of citizens 
to enter into local électoral compétition relatively easy and by widening 
citizens’ élection choices, independent local lists are close to the instru­
ments of direct democracy. They are a way of growing direct democracy 
into représentative democracy. However, direct democracy also has
33 Zakošek considère three main cleavages in Croatian transition society which hâve 
influenced voters’ behaviour: territorial-cultural, ideological-cultural, and socioeconomic 
cleavages (Zakošek, 2001: 108-110). Šiber has researched two main cleavages in Croatia, 
historical (two sides duringthe Second World War) and national (Šiber, 1998).
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well-elaborated shortcomings, where thè possibility of manipulation is 
thè most important one.34 On thè other hand, représentation is nowadays 
seen as part of democracy or even as a better instrument of democracy 
than forms of direct democracy (Offerdal, 2003: 274-276).
The practice of independent members of local councils in Croatia shows 
good and bad démocratisation potential of independent lists. In many 
local units they promote thè interests of some groups of citizens in a le- 
gitimate manner. They are really able to introduce more personal politicai 
engagement and familiarity of municipal politicians with their electorate. 
These are the reasons why assessments according to which their rôle is 
quite and generally negative (Kasapović, 2004: 93) cannot be accepted, 
despite the experienced shortcomings.
It should be admitted that the disadvantages of such lists are obvious in 
many cases in recent Croatian practice. They may be captured by and 
bring forward certain very specific vested interests in the local représen­
tative bodies, such as the interests of certain businesses, sociétal groups 
(e.g., elderly people, a sports club members) or even the interests of a rich 
entrepreneur or a populär person. Such and similar forms of clientelism 
should not be treated as désirable. They can also promote only thè private 
interests of the members elected from independent lists, showing »woriy- 
ing politicai inconsistency« (Kasapović, 2004: 89). Certain lists enter intő 
coalitions after real blackmaíling. The possibility of forming independent 
lists with intention to facilitate the abuse of financial donations cannot 
be excluded, which was one of the reasons fór passing the new Law on 
Financíng of Political Parties, Independent Lists and Candidates of 2007. 
Some of the lists were obviously hídden or reserve lists of certain politi­
cai parties, entering intő coalition with the »mother-party« immediately 
after élections. That shows a kind of cheating politicai behaviour. One of 
the motives for forming independent list can be quite lucrative, as every 
party and independent member of a représentative body hâve the right to 
finances for regulär activities.35 Etc.
34 About the shortcomings of referendum see, for example, Cerar, 2001.
35 There is a well-known case of changing status from party members to independent 
members in the Croatian Parliament during the mandate 2003-2007, mainly because of 
thè rather high amount of money for regulär activities. The initiative came from the leading 
party that has a weak majority. It is considered to be a mode of politicai corruption whose 
purpose to weaken thè politicai opposition and stabilise the Government. The same could 
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All the mentioned forms of non-democratic behaviour are at least an ín- 
dícator of less Consolidated and less stable politicai and party Systems 
in a transition country such as Croatia. An interesting phenomenon or 
tendency can be noted: some independent lists are trying to transform 
themselves into the (new) politicai parties. Along with the described case 
of independent lists led by Branimir Glavaš and his colleagues, there are 
others. First of all, independent list led by Tatjana Holjevac in Zagreb 
has managed to transform itself into thè leader of thè new politicai party 
named Sjedinjene nezavisne liste (United Independent Lists), although the 
number of lists that joined thè new party was quite small. The second 
attempt might happen ín Splítsko-dalmatínska County. Independent lo­
cal list led by Zeljko Jerkov írom Split succeeded ín gatheríng 27 leaders 
of thè locai lists írom the munícípalítíes on the territory of Splítsko-dal­
matínska County duríng February 2007 for information sharing purpose, 
although thè media speculated that the real reason was stronger network­
ing or formíng a uníted independent list for the parlíamentary élections of 
2007. Such a tendency illustrâtes a kind of distrust in the very institution 
of independent list by their founders.
Nevertheless, there are cases in which previously dissatisfied party mem- 
bers splít írom the mother party and form an independent list (or a new 
politicai party) very often just for local élections, because in such élections 
they hâve at least minimal chances to gain (a small number of) seats and 
survive polítícally. Be that what it may, the number of politicai parties is 
constantly rising (see also Cular, 2001: 125-130), as well as the number 
of independent lists competing in local élections.36 The tendency of frag­
mentation of party and politicai Systems is noticeable, although only a few 
large politicai parties play real and main rôles at the national level. 
Fragmentation is to a certain degree connected with instability in a po­
liticai System. Such instability might be caused by the voters and their 
changing choices. This phenomenon is probably based on a very low level 
of social trust, which is even lower than in other post-socialist countries 
(Salaj, 2006), as well as on thè fact that politicai profiles of a significant 
number of parties are not very clear. Additionally, there is strong empiri- 
cal evidence for a simple dichotomy of ideological cleavages in Croatian 
society. The first group consists of thè proponente of national, religious 
and traditional values, and the second of the proponents of secular and
36 Independent local Ests competed in the 55,8 % of ail local self-government units 
during local élections of 2001, while the share of such units rose up to 62,1 % in the local 
élections of 2005.
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modern values. Thís is a less complex pícture than ín other countríes, 
both developed and transítíonal (Zakošek, 1998: 48). Such a simple (too 
simple) situation has been ínfluencíng many politicai parties, except few 
largest ones, because they are forced to shíft theír ground ín search of po­
tential électoral base - thís is probably the reason why many of them have 
not got a clear politicai profile yet.
A moderate approach should be chosen in answering the question about 
the strengths and weaknesses, fonctions, nature and final évaluation of 
independent locai lists. Those lists seem to be a very useful politicai instru­
ment in several ways.
1. Firstly, they are reális tic means of contribution to personalisation 
of locai poli tics, which is a désirable aim from démocratisation 
point of view. Thus, the presence and success of the independent 
lists can indicate the degree of democracy in the politicai System 
development.
2. Despite the possibilités of manipulation, they promote perso­
nal accountability to voters. If they are successful, which is more 
probable in smaller locai units, their leaders and other members 
cannot avoid social pressure and cannot evade the dense network 
of more personalised social relationships. In the long run, thís 
pressure has to result in firmer accountability mechanisms, at 
least in smaller units.
3. Similar to the situation with the instruments of direct democracy, 
the veiy presence of possibiliiy to use them may relax tensions in 
politicai and sociétal life. Independent lists can be used whenever 
there are some cleavages at the micro level where large national 
politicai parties cannot respond, at least not in a short time. Theír 
success should notbe treated as a negative phenomenon, because 
ít only indicates that voters have need to express theír politicai 
will through them, not through other, probably more important 
politicai actors, such as politicai parties and/or directly elected 
mayors.
4. Usage in multinational local communities is one of the special 
cases of previous argument, but should be mentioned separately 
because of the particular importance interethnic relations have in 
contemporaiy building of démocratie institutions.
5. Independent local lists are ín a way substituting politicai parties ín 
smaller units, because smaller units are not, as a rule, in thè focus 
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national parties. The pénétration of politicai parties in smaller 
units is not so deep because of thè economic principle »probable 
costs outgrow possible results«. In such a way, independent local 
lists can be seen as additional but useful means of politicai System 
Stabilisation.
6. Independent local lists can motivate some voters to vote by filling 
possible gaps in politicai offer and in such a way increase démo­
cratie legitimacy of thè whole politicai System.
7. Independent local lists can be and should be, in principle, only ad­
ditional instrument of democracy. Croatian data about successful 
lists show that there was approximately one third of unsuccessful 
independent lists; approximately one third were successful but 
managed to gain only up to 10 % of the total number of seats in 
their respective units, about one sixth gained more than 10 % and 
up to 20 % of the total number of seats, etc. (Appendix 6).
The réalisation of the described advantages dépends on realistic circum- 
stances. Some of the circumstances can be dealt with intentionally in a 
short time, such as certain pièces of legal régulation. Some of them can be 
dealt with, but this is not probable, such as the territorial organisation of 
thè country. Some of them can be developed, but in the long run, such as 
démocratie or civic culture. Some of them cannot be treated intentionally, 
such as importance and influence of ideological cleavages. Etc.
The success of independent local list dépends on many different factors. 
Some of them can be mentioned for the illustration purposes. If a legal 
System provided for various, appropriate and well-designed channels of 
direct democracy, there should be narrower space and less need for in­
dependent lists. If civil society is weak, there should be greater need for 
independent lists; however, it might be questionable whether they will be 
generated and accepted by citizens. If there is a stable party System in a 
country, there should be less need for independent local lists, but under 
one more condition: other components of a politicai System should fonc­
tion well. If there are many social, ideological and other cleavages, there 
is wider space and greater need for a wide variety of different politicai 
actors that could represent the interests of ail social segments in a formai 
politicai System. Numerous other hypothèses can be developed and re- 
searched.
The final assessment of the rôle of independent lists has to take into ac- 
count all these and some additional circumstances and contingencies. 
It has to take into account the composite indicators of their value and
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should not be one-sided. Surely, they should not be blamed for all sorts of 
undesírable politicai behaviour, such as entering intő fuzzy coalitions. If 
there were no independent lists, certain politicai parties would probably 
be in position to tip thè balance. However, at thè end it should be noted 
that the connotation of thè word »independent« is in collision with thè 
real rôle of independent lists. They are not really independent. If so, they 
would be value and interest-free. On the contraiy, their role, similar to the 
role of politicai parties, is to be interest représentative actíng on behalf of 
a social segment or a community of citizens.
Conclusion
Independent locai lists should be treated in broader context outlined by a 
composite theoretical mixture. In such a way, analyses and research can 
be richer, more productive, more appropriate and more useful. A produc­
tive theoretical frame might be composed of the System theoiy, transition 
theoiy, neo-institutional theory, and démocratisation theoiy. Such a theo­
retical frame might seem to be too wide, too generai, and designed for a 
broader and wider, more complex phenomenon. However, a more generai 
theoretical frame can be more productive, too. It can be capable of catch- 
ing not only the issues closely connected with independent lists, but also 
the issues connected with all dimensions of the broader relevant context. 
This context includes locai self-government System and developmental 
processes in locai governance, party and politicai System, legal régulation, 
and real life of institutions in the public sphere, wider social environment, 
etc.
Nevertheless, one of the purposes of this article is to stimulate discus­
sion about a broader theoretical frame, not to design it, at least not in 
too many details. I tried to come to some basic theoretical ideas by re- 
viewing a concrete situation with independent local lists in the Croatian 
general local élection of 2005. In due course, after the consolidation of 
theoretical frame, subséquent empirical research seems to be quite neces- 
saiy. Reviewing the Statistical data and stoiytelling may give very valuable 
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Zagrebačka 3.060 309.696 101,2 9 25 697
Krapinsko- 
- za gorska 1.229 142.432 115,9 7 25 423
Sisačko-
-moslavačka 4.468 185.387 41,5 6 13 456
Karlovačka 3.626 141.787 39,1 5 17 649
Varaždinska 1.262 184.769 146,4 6 22 301
Koprivničko-
-križevačka 1.748 124.467 71,2 3 22 264
Bjelovarsko-
-bilogorska 2.640 133.084 50,4 5 18 323
Primorsko-
-goranska 3.588 305.505 85,1 14 22 510
Ličko-
-senjska 5.353 53.677 10,0 4 8 252
Virovitičko-
-podravska 2.024 93.389 46,1 3 13 190
Požeško- 
-s lavons ka 1.823 85.831 47,1 5 5 277
Brodsko-
-posavska 2.030 176.765 87,1 2 26 185
Zadarska 3.646 162.045 44,4 6 28 226
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Osječko-
-baranjska 4.155 330.506 79,5 7 35 263
Šibensko-
-kninska 2.984 112.891 37,8 5 15 196
Vukovarsko-
-srijemska 2.454 204.768 83,4 5 26 85
Splitsko-
-dalmatinska 4.540 463.676 102,1 16 39 367
Istarska 2.813 206.344 73,4 10 31 656
Dubrovačko-
-neretvanska 1.781 122.870 69,0 5 17 231
Međimurska 729 118.426 162,4 3 22 129
City of 
Zagreb 641 779.145 1.215,5 1 0 70
CROATIA 56.594 4.437.460 78,4 126+1 429 6.750
2. The large towns
Town Number of inhabitants Town Number of inhabitants
Split 188.694 Sisak 52.236
Rijeka 144.043 Šibenik 49.373
Osijek 114.616 Varaždin 49.075
Zadar 72.718 Dubrovnik 43.770
Velika Gorica 63.517 Bjelovar 41.869
Slavonski Brod 60.946 Samobor 36.206
Karlovac 59.395 Vinkovci 35.912
Pula 58.594







































1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Zagrebačka 2 - - 45 0
Towns 6/2 12 5 11 124 8,9
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-zagorska 2 - - 41 0
Towns 5/2 11 7 11 79 13,9
Communes 16/9 21 12 22 208 10,6
Sisačko-
-moslavačka 1 - - 49 0
Towns 6/- 12 3 4 122 3,3
Communes 9/4 16 12 21 134 15,7
Karlovačka - - - -
Towns 4/1 7 3 5 72 6,9
Communes 10/7 11 10 17 116 14,7
Varaždinska - - - -
Towns 2/4 2 1 1 30 3,3
Communes 3/19 4 3 3 41 7,3
Koprivničko-
-križevačka - - - -
Towns 2/1 2 - - 44 0
Communes 11/11 13 12 27 139 19,4
Bjelovarsko-
-bilogorska 1 - - 41 0
Towns 2/3 3 1 1 34 2,9
Communes 3/15 3 2 3 43 7,0
Primorsko-
-goranska 1 - - 41 0
Towns 10/4 19 11 25 170 14,7
Communes 16/5 28 21 41 194 21,1
Licko-senjska - - - -
Towns 2/2 3 1 4 28 14,3
Communes 4/4 7 5 10 52 19,2
Virovitičko-
-podravska - - - -
Towns 2/1 3 1 1 38 2,6
Communes 6/7 8 6 11 82 13,4
Požeško- 
-s lavons ka 1 - - 42 0
Towns 3/1 4 2 2 47 4,3
Communes 2/4 4 - - 28 0
Brodsko-
-posavska 1 - - 51 0
Towns 2/- 5 2 5 44 11,4
Communes 10/16 11 9 14 130 10,8
Zadarska 1 1 3 41 7,3
Towns 5/1 15 9 16 85 18,8
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Communes 23/4 34 26 39 297 13,1
Osječko-
-baranjska 1 1 14 47 29,8
Towns 7/- 21 7 23 135 17,0
Communes 25/10 49 39 113 318 35,5
Šibensko-
-kninska - - - -
Towns 3/2 5 1 8 57 14,0
Communes 9/5 16 13 28 103 27,2
Vukovarsko-
-srijemska 2 - - 0
Towns 2/2 4 - - 42 0
Communes 14/12 28 22 42 178 23,6
Splitsko-
-dalmatinska 2 - - 51 0
Towns 14/2 26 16 27 224 12,1
Communes 29/10 55 38 70 336 20,8
Istarska 1 - - 41 0
Towns 9/1 23 13 25 153 16,3
Communes 22/7 31 29 83 268 31,0
Dubrovačko-
-neretvanska 1 1 7 41 17,1
Towns 5/- 8 6 21 83 25,3
Communes 8/9 14 12 14 91 15,4
Međimurska - - - -
Towns 3/- 5 4 5 53 9,4
Communes 14/8 22 17 33 186 17,7
Zagreb 4 2 7 51 13,7
Towns - total 











397 306 629 3.106 20,3
Counties - Z 
%
13/7
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Communes 397 306 77,1 91 22,9 629 2,1
Towns 194 95 49,0 99 51,0 202 2,1
Counties 17 2 11,8 15 88,2 21 10,5
CROATI A 608 403 66,3 205 33,7 852 2,1
5. The most successful examples - ILLs which won thè 
élections in their respective local self-government units
Localself-governme nt 
unit
No. of seats %
(from total) No. of votes
No. of 
inhabitants
Trnava c 10/13 76,9 635 1.900
Primosten c 8/11 72,7 1.061 2.992
Domaš ine c c 9/13 69,2 560 2.459
Sveta Nedelja c 10/15 66,7 880 2.909
Metković t 11/17 64,7 3.872 15.384
Baie c 7/11 63,6 336 1.047
Žumberak c 8/13 61,5 365 1.185
Jagodnjak c 5/9 55,6 476 2.147
Mošćenička Draga c 5/9 55,6 440 1.641
Ernestinovo c 6/11 54,5 466 2.225
Lokvičići c 6/11 54,5 271 1.037
Viškovci c 6/11 54,5 357 2.060











seats -10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80
No. of lists 205 203 108 44 26 9 6 5 2
%
(608=100) 33,7 33,4 17,8 7,2 4,3 1,5 1,0 0,8 0,3
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7. Success of ILLs in thè City of Zagreb territorial élections 
of 2000 and 2005














year 2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 200C 2005
1 2 3 4 5 6




36.475 15 - - 15 15 - -
Trnje 45.199 19 - 1 19 15 - 6,7
Maksimir 49.449 18 1 - 19 15 5,3 -
Peščenica - 
Žitnjak 58.349 19 - - 19 19 - -
Novi Zagreb 
- istok 65.424 19 - 1 19 19 - 5,3
Novi Zagreb 
- zapad 47.163 14 1 1 15 15 6,7 6,7
Trešnjevka 
- sjever 55.352 19 - - 19 19 - -
Trešnjevka - 
jug
67.050 19 - - 19 19 - -
Črnomerec 38.679 15 - - 15 15 - -
Gornja
Dubrava 61.112 19 - 1 19 19 - 5,3
Donja
Dubrava 35.920 15 - - 15 15 - -
Stenjevec 40.949 12 3 1 15 15 20 6,7
Podsused 
- Vrapče 42.341 15 - 1 15 15 - 6,7
Podsljeme 17.531 10 1 2 11 11 9,1 18,2
Sesvete 58.416 19 - - 19 19 - -
Brezovica 10.837 8 3 4 11 11 27,3 36,4
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8. ILLs share in thè City of Zagreb Assembly 2001 and 2005
Elections year No. of seats won by parties
No. of seats won 
by ILLs
ILLs share 
(total no. of seats 
= 51) %
2001 46 5 ( 1 list) 9,8







INDEPENDENT LOCAL LISTS IN CROATIA:
IN A SEARCH FOR A COMPOSITE THEORETICAL FRAME
Summary
The paper deals with independent local lists in Croatia, in both analytic and 
theoretical way. At the beginning, the development and current state of local 
self-government and local politicai System in Croatia are described. Data on the 
independent local lists’ participation and success during the 2005 general local 
élections are presented and analysed. Four theoretical approaches are proposed 
for an interprétation of the results: System, transition, neo-institutional and dé­
mocratisation theory. None of them can alone explain the results in a satisfac- 
tory manner. That is reason why the author proposes a composite theoretical 
frame, which can explain the rôle and influence of a broader relevant context 
on the independent local lists’ élection success. Certain theoretical hypothèses 
are generated and to some extent verified in this paper. The advantages of the 
independent local lists and certain success factors ofsuch lists are identified. Ad­
ditional theoretical work and empirical vérification are needed. Both qualitative 
insights and quantitative research can be useful.
Key words: independent local lists, local self-government - Croatia, local po­
liticai System, local élections, composite theoretical frame (system, transition, 
neo-institutional, démocratisation theory)
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NEZAVISNE LOKALNE LISTE U HRVATSKOJ 
- U POTRAZI ZA SLOŽENIM TEORIJSKIM OKVIROM 
Sažetak
U radu se prikazuju, analiziraju i teorijski objašnjavaju podaci o sudjelovanju 
i uspjehu nezavisnih lokalnih lista na općim lokalnim izborima u Hrvatskoj 
2005. No, prije toga se opisuje razvoj i stanje lokalne samouprave i lokal­
nog političkog sustava u Hrvatskoj. Rezultati se pokušavaju teorijski objasniti 
polazeći od četiriju teorijskih polazišta, teorije sustava, tranzicijske teorije, neo- 
institucionalne teorije i teorije demokratizacije. Kako nijedno od tih polazišta 
ne daje sasvim zadovoljavajuće rezultate, pokušava se oblikovati jedan složeniji 
teorijski pristup. Razvijene su i provjerene određene teorijske hipoteze. U radu su 
također identificirane dobre strane nezavisnih lokalnih lista: one pridonose per­
sonalizaciji lokalnih izbora; povećavaju osobnu odgovornost prema biračima; 
smanjuju napetosti u lokalnoj političkoj zajednici, jer omogućuju biračima da 
izraze svoje političke stavove i mimo političkih stranaka; olakšavaju duboke lo­
kalne podjele, naročito međunacionalne, tamo gdje ih ima; osiguravaju političku 
aktivnost i u malim lokalnim jedinicama u kojima nacionalne političke stranke 
nemaju interesa sudjelovati na izborima; dodatno motiviraju birače da izađu na 
izbore i tako učvršćuju demokratski politički legitimitet; predstavljaju dodatni 
instrument demokratizacije. Identificirani su i određeni faktori uspjeha nezavi­
snih lista na lokalnim izborima, posebno oni koji pripadaju širem kontekstu u 
kojem djeluje lokalni politički sustav (postojanje oblika neposredne demokracije; 
stupanj razvijenosti civilnog društva; stabilnost i uspješnost stranačkog sustava; 
veličina i priroda lokalnih jedinica; itd.). Za cjeloviti model proučavanja ne­
zavisnih lokalnih lista potrebno je dodatno razvijati teorijski okvir te empirijski 
provjeravati iz njega izvedene hipoteze. U toj provjeri važni su dodatni kvalita­
tivni uvidi i kvantitativna istraživanja.
Ključne riječi: nezavisne lokalne liste, lokalna samouprava - Hrvatska, lokalni 
politički sustav, lokalni izbori, složeni teorijski okvir (teorija sustava, tranzicij­
ska teorija, neo-institucionalna teorija i teorija demokratizacije)
H
R
VA
TS
KA
 J
AV
N
A 
U
PR
AV
A
